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I. INTRODUCTION
"[F]rom time to time we are called to look back to examine our still-
recent history and correct injustice where possible."'
Conversations regarding systemic racism and the role of the criminal
justice system in South Carolina have been in the spotlight as a result of the
2017 J.D. Candidate at the University of South Carolina School of Law.
1. Order Vacating Judgment at 27, South Carolina v. Stinney (S.C. Cir. Ct. Dec. 17,
2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter Order].
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race-based murder of nine African-Americans in a Charleston church in
2015.2 In the wake of the shooting, protestors from South Carolina and
around the country pleaded for the removal of the Confederate flag flying
outside the state's capitol building.3 Less than a month after the shooting, the
South Carolina Senate voted to take the flag down.4 Removal of the
Confederate flag was a clear indication of South Carolina's efforts towards
addressing racial injustices. Despite this progress, the vestiges of racism and
stigmatization remain in the criminal justice system, compelling states like
South Carolina to address injustices and seek to correct them.
The stigma of a conviction lives on long after a defendant has died,
tarnishing both the defendant's and his family's livelihood. Such was the
case with fourteen-year-old African-American George Stinney, Jr. after his
6execution in 1944. Stinney was charged with murdering two Caucasian girls
7near his home in Alcolu, South Carolina. The trial and sentencing were
2. See Nick Corasaniti, Richard Perez-Pena, & Lizette Alvarez, Church Massacre
Suspect Held as Charleston Grieves, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 18, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/19/us/charleston-church-shooting.html (providing that "[t]he
mass murder of nine people who gathered . .. for Bible study at a landmark black church has
shaken a city whose history from slavery to the Civil War to the present is inseparable from
the nation's anguished struggle with race").
3. Abby Phillip & Chico Harlan, Hundreds March in Charleston, Columbia to take
down Confederate flag, WASH. POST (Jun. 20, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/06/20/hundreds-march-in-
charleston-columbia-to-take-down-confederate-flag/.
4. Bill Chappell, In Final Vote, South Carolina Senate Moves to Take Down
Confederate Flag, NPR (July 7, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/07/07/
420825226/in-final-vote-south-carolina-senate-moves-to-take-down-confederate-flag.
5. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The
Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and
Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 588 (2005) ("[T]hose who are innocent and
sentenced to death suffer the additional devastation of being blamed for a terrible crime; their
names, families, and entire lives are forever tainted by such ignominy, quite apart from the
death of their bodies.").
6. Lindsey Bever, It Took 10 Minutes to Convict 14-year-old George Stinney Jr. It
Took 70 Years After his Execution to Exonerate Him, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/moming-mix/wp/2014/12/18/the-rush-job-conviction-
of-14-year-old-george-stinney-exonerated-70-years-after-execution/.
7. Brief of Defendant/Petitioner as Amicus Curiae at 9-14, State of South Carolina v.
George Stinney, Jr., (Feb. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Defendant's Brief] (citing Stinney Trial
Record, McLeod Notes; Stinney Hearing Stipulated Documents, Ruffner aff.; A.C. Bozard
Statement; Stinney Filed Stipulations and Consent Order, ¶2). Because no formal case or trial
transcript exists of the adjudication of Stinney in 1944, the recitation of the facts comes from
the amicus brief
918 [VOL. 6 8: 917
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conducted in only one day, in which the jury deliberated for only ten
minutes. Stinney was sentenced to death by execution.9
In February 2014, the Civil Rights and Restorative Justice Project
submitted an amicus curiae brief petitioning for the writ of corm nobis to
redress the grave miscarriages of justice against Stinney.1o Later that year,
South Carolina's Fourteenth Judicial Circuit Court issued an order granting
coram nobis relief and vacating Stinney's conviction." Stinney's brother,
Charles, described how Stinney's conviction severely affected the whole
family, as they believed that the conviction and execution could have
happened to any one of the family members.12 Following George Stinney's
execution, the Stinney family left South Carolina and relocated to New York
fearing for their safety.'3
While the Stinney case was wrought with "extraordinary
circumstances"14 that "simply do not apply in most cases,"" it serves as a
reminder that South Carolina needs to re-consider its procedural vehicles for
post-conviction relief. The law in South Carolina, in general, provides
criminal defendants with three post-conviction avenues, one of which the
legislature codified a statute to serve as an exclusive post-conviction
remedy. These post-conviction vehicles, however, are not well-suited to
8. Order at 3 (citing Stinney Stipulations, ¶¶ 9-14).
9. Id
10. Defendant's Brief at 3.
11. Order at 28.
12. Defendant's Brief at 31 (citing SH Affidavit of Bishop Charles Stinney, ¶ 10).
13. Id
14. Order at 27 (discussing an insufficient trial record that led to numerous
Constitutional deprivations).
15. Id
16. The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20 (2015).
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides:
Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution or laws of this State;
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that
requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or conditional release
unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint;
or
(6) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any
ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or
other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy; may institute, without paying a
filing fee, a proceeding under this chapter to secure relief Provided, however, that
3
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allow a court to reopen and correct its judgment upon discovery of new
information not appearing in the record. Instead, coram nobis proceedings
are the best, and often only, vehicle available in these cases. Thus, although
coram nobis is an ancient writ with limited treatment in South Carolina,7 its
relevance as an available post-conviction remedy is exceedingly important in
light of South Carolina's highly publicized background of racial tension in
the criminal justice system.'8
This Note focuses on reviving coram nobis as a viable post-conviction
remedy, and proposes changing the evidentiary standard for granting such
petitions. In assessing petitions for coram nobis, South Carolina should
adopt a "reasonable probability" standard that errors of fact not apparent on
the record would have changed the initial trial.19 By adopting a "reasonable
probability" standard, South Carolina practitioners will be able to make
greater use of coram nobis, thus providing a holistic mechanism of post-
20conviction remedies for clients. Part II provides a general discussion of
different post-conviction remedies available in South Carolina, a brief
historical perspective on coram nobis, and a discussion of how the writ
21
differs from other post-conviction remedies. Part III discusses South
Carolina's resurrection of coram nobis in the case of State v. Stinney. Part IV
provides an analysis of how other jurisdictions treat coram nobis and employ
the reasonable probability standard. Lastly, Part V discusses the
impracticality of employing any standard higher than "reasonable
this section shall not be construed to permit collateral attack on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.
(A) This remedy is not a substitute for not does it affect any remedy incident to the
proceedings in the trial court, or of direct review of the sentence or conviction.
Except as otherwise provide in this chapter, it comprehends and takes the place of
all other common law, statutory or other remedies heretofore available for
challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in
place of them. Id.
17. As discussed infra Part III, South Carolina has only addressed substantive issues
regarding the writ in one case.
18. See, e.g., Haley Moved to Tears Talking About Emanuel AME Shooting During
State of the State, WPDE (Jan. 20, 2016), http://wpde.com/news/local-and-state/gov-haley-
moved-to-tears-talking-about-emanuel-ame-shooting-during-state-of-the-state (South Carolina
Governor Haley addressing the 2015 Charleston shooting in her State address); Mark Berman,
South Carolina Police Officer in Walter Scott Shooting Indicted on Murder Charge, WASH.
POST (Jun. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2015/06/08/police-officer-who-shot-walter-scott-indicted-for-murder/ (discussing a
murder charge against a South Carolina police officer who shot an unarmed African-American
male).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
920 [VOL. 6 8: 917
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probability" and considers policy reasons why South Carolina should follow
other jurisdictions' lowered standard for coram nobis in cases in which the
22defendant presents evidence that would have altered the initial judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Brief History of South Carolina's Available Post-Conviction Relief
Remedies
Broadly speaking, post-conviction remedies are intended to buffer
against "unjust, unconstitutional, and erroneous confinements."23 Post-
conviction relief is often referred to as "collateral review," which is "[a]n
attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal."24 Avenues
25
of collateral review stand apart from the process of direct review, which
includes remedies such as post-trial motions, and includes requests for relief
26 2
based on constitutional violations, habeas corpus review,27 and review by
writs of error such as audita querela,28 or coram nobis.29
In South Carolina, there are three post-conviction remedies available:
(1) the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act (UPCPA); (2) state level
habeas corpus; and (3) motions for a new trial based on after-discovered
evidence.30 The first post-conviction remedy available is the UPCPA, which
provides that any person who has been convicted of or sentenced for
committing a crime may initiate a post-conviction relief proceeding.31 The
purpose of post-conviction relief under South Carolina's UPCPA is to
provide convicted persons with a method to address any unresolved or
previously unmentioned questions of fact or law relevant to their
22. See infra Part V.
23. John H. Blume, An Introduction to Post-Conviction Remedies, Practice and
Procedure in South Carolina, 45 S.C. L. REv. 235, 236 (1994).
24. Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 552 (2011) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 298 (9th
ed. 2009)).
2 5. Id.
26. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)).
27. Id. (noting how the Court has used the terms "habeas corpus" and "collateral
review" interchangeably).
28. See United States v. Gamboa, 608 F.3d 492, 494-95 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying the
defendant's petition for the writ of audita querela because he should have requested post-
conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
29. Wall, 562 U.S. at 552 (2011) (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 510-
511 (1954)) (noting how the Court has described coram nobis as a means of collateral attack).
30. See Blume, supra note 23, at 238 (providing a general overview of the three post-
conviction remedies available in South Carolina).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(A) (2015).
2017] 921
5
Bure: Coram Nobis and State v. Stinney: Why South Carolina Should Revit
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
32
sentences. Although the Act is intended to be exclusive, "tak[ing] the place
of all other common law, statutory or other remedies heretofore available for
challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence,"33 some exceptions
remain. 4
The second post-conviction remedy available in South Carolina, state
habeas corpus, provides prisoners a mechanism to test the legality of their
present detention.3 The only remedy that can be granted for habeas corpus
is release from custody.36 While the UPCPA was intended to supersede
statutory remedies challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence such
as habeas corpus, the writ is still used in South Carolina.37 The most recent
state habeas corpus case outlining the writ's scope is Butler v. State,38 in
which the Supreme Court of South Carolina opined that the writ will be
granted only in circumstances where there was a "'violation, which, in the
setting [of the violation], constitutes a denial of fundamental fairness
shocking to the universal sense of justice."' 39 After Butler, the South
Carolina Supreme Court emphasized that habeas corpus is a way to correct
fundamental miscarriages of justice after a prisoner has exhausted all other
available remedies.40
The third post-conviction remedy in South Carolina, motion for a new
trial based on after-discovered evidence, addresses situations in which
32. Id.
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(B) (2015); see also Blume, supra note 23, at 245.
34. For example, while the UPCPA supersedes and encompasses state-level habeas
corpus provided by the statute, habeas corpus remains available when other remedies are
inadequate or unavailable. See Gibson v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 41, 495 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1998)
("[H]abeas corpus continues to be available as a constitutional remedy provided a petitioner
qualifies for this extraordinary relief and clears the procedural hurdles.").
35. Id (citing McCall v. State, 247 S.C. 15, 145 S.E.2d 419 (1965)).
36. Gibson v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 40, 495 S.E.2d 426, 427 (1998) (citing McCall v.
State, 247 S.C. 15, 145 S.E.2d 419 (1965)).
37. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 467, 397 S.E.2d 87, 87 (1990) (granting the
petitioner's writ for habeas corpus); Crowe v. Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 764, 259 S.E.2d 614, 615
(1979) (providing that while the "appellant's petition contained ... allegations which were
properly cognizable under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act," the court found the
issues on appeal were "in the nature of [a] Habeas corpus proceeding").
38. Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 468, 397 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1990).
39. Id (quoting State v. Miller, 84 A.2d 459, 463 (1951)) (emphasis in original).
40. See State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 69, 406 S.E.2d 315, 328 (1991) (Toal, J.,
concurring) ("[A]n imprisoned individual may obtain a writ of habeas corpus from this Court
after exhausting all other sources of relief," if he can satisfy the Butler standard); Drayton v.
Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 9, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520 n. 2 ("This is not to say that a defendant who has
exhausted his opportunities for review on direct appeal and post-conviction relief is completely
without a remedy" because he can still seek a writ of habeas corpus under some
circumstances), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 607 (1993)).
922 [VOL. 6 8: 917
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evidence now available was not known at the time of trial. In order for a
motion for a new trial to be granted, the after-discovered evidence must
reflect the defendant's innocence or, in capital cases, the defendant's moral
culpability.42 To warrant a new trial, a defendant must prove that the newly
discovered evidence: (1) [would] probably change the result if a new trial is
granted; (2) has been discovered since the trial; (3) could not have been
discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence; (4) is material to
the issue; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.3
B. Coram Nobis: The Legal "Hail Mary. "
"A Hail Mary in American football is a long forward pass made in
desperation at the end of a game, with only a small chance of success. The
writ of coram nobis is its criminal-law equivalent." 44
Coram nobis is an historic common-law writ that allows criminal
defendants to request relief from judgment on the premise that their
convictions were "fundamentally flawed."45 Black's Law Dictionary defines
the writ as a form of post-conviction relief "directed to a court for review of
its own judgment and predicated on alleged errors of fact."46 Further, some
scholars view the writ as a procedural vehicle to re-open criminal cases
when new proof has emerged establishing egregious government
misconduct.47
41. Blume, supra note 23, at 264.
42. Id.
43. State v. Clamp, 225 S.C. 89, 94, 80 S.E.2d 918, 920 (1954) (quoting State v.
Strickland, 201 S.C. 170, 170, 22 S.E.2d 417, 418 (1942)).
44. United States v. George, No. 11-1815 (1st Cir. Apr. 18, 2012).
45. Daniel F. Piar, Using Coram Nobis to Attack Wrongful Convictions: A New Look at
an Ancient Writ, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 505, 505 (2003) (citing Andrew J. Schatkin, Criminal
Procedure, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 405, 482 n.485 (1995)).
46. Coram Nobis, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
47. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress: A "Social
Healing through Justice" Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu
Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 13-15 n. 43 (2009) (citing Korematsu Petition
for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, filed with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, January 19, 1983 (No. CR-2763W)) (discussing the aftermath of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the
defendant/petitioner requested that the federal district court vacate the forty-year old
conviction on the grounds that newly uncovered evidence regarding declassified government
documents warranted coram nobis relief).
2017] CRIMINAL LAW 923
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The writ of coram nobis was developed in England during the sixteenth
century.48 American courts began to use coram nobis as early as the
beginning of the nineteenth century.49 During its early use in America, the
5 0writ was used in both civil and criminal cases as a means to "correct errors
of fact that could not have been ascertained through ordinary diligence at the
time of the trial and that, in all probability, would have affected [the trial's]
outcome."5' While the writ's suggested purpose focused on new factual
presentations of evidence, some early uses in American courts presented
situations in which cases were reconsidered on grounds other than newly
52discovered facts. For example, the court in Chambers v. State held that the
lower court's denial of coram nobis was in error and set aside guilty pleas
based on evidence that the pleas were entered as a result of "threats,
intimidations, and beatings while in prison."53
Despite coram nobis' liberal application in early cases, both state and
federal courts began to expand statutory remedies available for post-
conviction relief, which in turn limited the availability and purpose of the
writ.54 For example, Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
55South Carolina's parallel rule, abolished the writ for use in civil cases.
48. See, e.g., Piar, supra note 45, at 506 (citing Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882);
John S. Gillig, Kentucky Post-Conviction Remedies and the Judicial Development of Kentucky
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42, 83 KY. L.J. 265, 319-30 (1994-95); Morgan Prickett, The
Writ ofError Coram Nobis in Calfornia, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 3-14 (1990); Abraham
L. Freedman, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 3 TEMP L. Q. 365, 367-70 (1929); Albert F.
Neumann, Comment, Criminal Law-Writ ofError Coram Nobis, 11 Wis. L. REV. 248 (1936);
Larry W. Yackle, POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES § 37 (1981)).
49. See, e.g., Strode v. Stafford Justices, 23 F. Cas. 236, 236 (C.C.D. Va. 1810)
(superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Kerner, 895 F.2d 1159, 1990)); Piar, supra
note 45, at 507.
50. See Michelle L. Curley, The Common Law Writ of Error Coram Nobis Remains
Available as a Civil Procedure to Challenge Collaterally a Criminal Judgment, 59 MD. L.
REV. 767, 776 (2000) (providing that the writ has been available to defendants in Maryland in
both criminal and civil cases for over 200 years).
51. Id at 771.
52. See, e.g., Hogan v. Court of General Sessions, 296 N.Y. 1, 9, 68 N.E.2d 849, 852-
53 (1946) (acknowledging that the writ may be used to vacate the court's own judgment in a
case in which the defendant was not advised of his right to counsel).
53. Chambers v. State, 158 So. 153, 158 (Fla. 1934).
54. Piar, supra note 45, at 508 (citing United States v. Mandel, 853 F. Supp. 177 (D.
Md. 1994)).
55. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(e), adopted in 1946, provides in pertinent part: "The following
are abolished: bills of review, bills in the nature of bills of review, and writs of coram nobis,
coram vobis, and audita querela." South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that
"[w]rits of coram nobis .. are abolished."
924 [VOL. 6 8: 917
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Nonetheless, although the writ is unavailable in civil proceedings, it is still
56
available in criminal cases.
C. How Coram Nobis Differs from Other Post-Conviction Remedies in
South Carolina
While South Carolina's UPCPA appears to provide persons with a
comprehensive mechanism for post-conviction relief, the Act differs from
coram nobis in regards to who may initiate a proceeding. Unlike the
UPCPA in which the person who was convicted or sentenced of a crime is
the only person who may bring a post-conviction proceeding under the Act,
coram nobis gives third-party litigants standing to assert the constitutional
rights of another. For example, coram nobis allows a family member of a
wrongly convicted person who is now deceased or otherwise unable to raise
a claim to seek redress for the constitutional violations against the
decedent.59 Thus, the procedural hurdles the UPCPA places upon an
applicant do not encumber the writ of coram nobis; this availability of third-
party standing permits a litigant to redress constitutional deprivations of a
convicted person who is unable to assert his own constitutional rights before
a court.60
Further, coram nobis and the UPCPA differ regarding subsequent
applications for obtaining post-conviction relief. The South Carolina
UPCPA places a significant limitation on inmates who make successive
applications. A successive application, generally, may not contain issues (1)
that were presented in the original application; (2) that were fully
adjudicated in the first appeal or were knowingly and voluntarily waived; or
(3) that were not raised at all, unless the applicant can provide a sufficient
reason why the issue was not previously raised.6 Thus, it appears that the
56. See Bereano v. United States, 706 F.3d 568, 576 n.8 (4th Cir. 2013) ("Although the
adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) in 1946 abolished the writ of coram nobis in
civil cases, coram nobis remains available to challenge a criminal conviction."); United States
v. Morgan, 346 US. 502, 505 n.4 (1954) (citing Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 494 (1885))
(providing that coram nobis is "a step in the criminal case and not, like habeas corpus where
relief is sought in a separate case and record, the beginning of a separate civil Proceeding").
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20 (2015).
58. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991) (providing that
"a litigant may raise a claim on behalf of a third party if the litigant can demonstrate that he or
she has suffered a concrete, redressable injury, that he or she has a close relation with the third




61. U.S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-90 (2016).
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Act effectively provides applicants with only one chance at post-conviction
relief.62 In contrast, coram nobis allows a petitioner to take another bite of
the post-conviction apple if there is newly discovered evidence that would
have changed the outcome of the initial judgment.
Unlike coram nobis, the writ of habeas corpus only permits relief to a
person who is presently in custody.63 As one scholar notes, "[t]he major
practical difference between habeas corpus and coram nobis in modem law
is that habeas corpus will lie only where the petitioner is in custody, whereas
coram nobis can be used even after a sentence has been served and a
petitioner released."64 Further, habeas corpus is used to attack the legality of
65sentencing and detention in violation of the Constitution, whereas coram
nobis is a collateral attack on a wrongful conviction due to facts unknown at
trial.
Moreover, coram nobis differs from a motion for a new trial based on
after-discovered evidence. A motion for a new trial in South Carolina
addresses claims based on presentations of evidence that were not known to
exist at the time of trial." Thus, it appears that coram nobis was a "precursor
to the modem motion for a new trial," as both remedies seek a new trial.
However, a motion for a new trial is seen as a continuation of the original
case, whereas coram nobis is an "independent civil action challenging the
criminal conviction." 69
III. THE CASE OF STATE V. STINNEYAND THE RESURRECTION OF CORAMNOBIS
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
For a criminal defendant in South Carolina who seeks to challenge
constitutional deprivations regarding his conviction or sentence, utilizing the
UPCPA would afford the defendant a comprehensive method needed to
62. See Gamble v. State, 298 S.C. 176, 178, 379 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1989) (indicating that
the UPCPA and court decisions are intended to provide petitioner with "one bite at the
apple... ").
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-17-10 (2015).
64. Piar, supra note 45, at 508 n. 39 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2255 (2000)).
65. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (habeas corpus "is grounded in the
principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation
of the Constitution not to correct errors of fact").
66. Id. at 408.
67. Blume, supra note 23, at 264.
68. John H. Blume & Emily Paavola, A Reintroduction: Survival Skills for Post-
Conviction Practice in South Carolina, 4 CHARLESTON L. REv. 223, 227 n. 14 (2010) (citing
Larry W. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies § 4, at 7 (1981 & Supp. 1993)).
69. Id
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address such claims.70 However, in circumstances in which the defendant is
no longer able to bring the challenge himself, coram nobis steps in to allow
third-party standing to challenge his conviction.7 ' This third-party standing
was employed in 2014 when the two siblings of George Stinney, Jr., who
was convicted of murder and executed by electrocution, filed a petition for
72writ of coram nobis in South Carolina. After the siblings retained counsel,
the Civil Rights and Restorative Justice Project of the Northeastern
University School of Law filed an amicus curiae brief in support of
defendant George Stinney, Jr. seeking posthumous relief for his wrongful
conviction and execution by the State of South Carolina.73 As previously
mentioned, George Stinney, Jr. was a fourteen-year-old African-American
boy who was taken into police custody on March 25, 1944 on suspicion of
murdering two girls in Alcolu, South Carolina.74
The facts of the case illuminate the manifest egregiousness exercised by
the original court in conducting its investigation and trial of Stinney. On
March 24, 1944, two young girls, ages 7 and 11, were out riding bikes in a
75 76field near Stinney's home. The two girls never returned home. The next
day, a search party found the girls' bodies lying in a ditch. Shortly after
their bodies were found, the police arrested Stinney. Within hours of his
79arrest, Stinney confessed to the murders. One month after his arrest,
Stinney was tried for the murder of one of the young girls.0 While Stinney
was in police custody from the time of his arrest to his trial and conviction,
70. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-10 et seq. (2015).
71. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991).
72. Order at 1.
73. Defendant's Brief at 2-3.
74. Id at 9-12 (citing Stinney Trial Record, McLeod Notes; Stinney Hearing Stipulated
Documents, Ruffner aff.; ST, A.C. Bozard Statement; Stinney Filed Stipulations and Consent
Order, ¶ 2).
75. Id at 10 (citing SH, Charles Stinney Affidavit, ¶¶ 4-5; Charles Stinney Dep., 5, 10-
11, 30; Amie Stinney Aff., 1).
76. Order at 2.
77. Order at 2; Defendant's Brief at 11 (citing SH, Batson Affidavit, ¶ 4).
78. Order at 2.
79. Id Interestingly, in her order vacating Stinney's conviction, Judge Mullen stated
that "[w]hile law enforcement testified that a confession occurred, no written confession exists
in the record today." Id
80. Defendant's Brief at 9 (citing Stinney Stipulations, ¶ 11-12). For reasons
unexplained in either the Defendant's Brief or the Order, Stinney was never tried for the
murder of the other girl.
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his parents were not able to visit him and none of his relatives attended the
trial.82
Although the solicitor's notes indicated that the murder weapon was a
spike,8 "[n]othing remains from documentary evidence indicating whether a
murder weapon, bloody clothes or other demonstrative evidence were
8,4admitted at trial." The jury deliberated for only ten minutes, after which
the all-white jury found Stinney guilty of murder. Both the trial and the
sentencing were conducted in one day, 1 and, on that day, Stinney was
sentenced to death by electrocution. Stinney's attorney did not file an
appeal, nor did he request a stay of execution. On June 16, 1944, less than
three months after his arrest,89 Stinney was executed.90
Seventy years after Stinney's execution, the Civil Rights and
Restorative Justice Project submitted an amicus curiae brief requesting
"posthumous relief. . . to redress grave miscarriages of justice . . . [and] the
constitutional protections ... [to which] [Stinney] was entitled at the time of
his trial, including the right to effective counsel, to a fairly selected jury, and
not to incriminate himself."91 In their brief, the petitioners requested that the
Circuit Court grant the writ of coram nobis.92 The petitioners argued that
Stinney was denied fundamental due process93 and deprived of his right to
effective counsel,94 thus warranting coram nobis relief.
On December 16, 2014, the presiding Circuit Court judge issued an
order vacating Stinney's judgment, finding "fundamental, Constitutional
violations of due process . . . ."9 In her order, the judge acknowledged the
81. Id. at 12 (citing SH, Francis Batson Aff.; SH, Charles Stinney Dep., 23-24; SH,
Charles Stinney Aff., ¶¶ 7-8). We do not know if Stinney's parents simply were not able to
visit him, or if they were not allowed to visit him during his time in police custody.
82. Id.
83. Order at 2.
84. Id.
85. Id at 2-3.
86. Id at 2.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id. at 3; Defendant's Brief at 9 (citing Stinney Stipulations, ¶ 13).
89. Order at 3.
90. Id.
91. Defendant's Brief at 3.
92. Id at 30.
93. See id. at 15 (arguing that no exculpatory witnesses were called at trial, even though
such witnesses were available, and that Stinney's confession was wrongfully admitted).
94. See id. (arguing that Stinney's lawyer failed to preserve his right to appeal his
conviction and sentence).
95. Order at 1.
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limited availability of coram nobis,96 calling it an "extraordinary remedy,
designed to protect fundamental due process rights."97 The court granted
coram nobis relief,98 finding that violation of Stinney's procedural due
process rights "tainted his prosecution."99 The court's reasons for granting
coram nobis relief included a coerced confession by Stinney, a lack of
effective assistance of counsel, failure to select an impartial jury, and
execution of a minor.100 Thus, coram nobis was an effective post-conviction
remedy that both allowed the original court to redress its fundamental
miscarriages of justice and provided the Stinney family with solace
eradicating the stigma of his conviction.
IV. A COMPARISON OF HOW OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND SOUTH CAROLINA
TREAT CORAMNOBIS
A. Bringing Coram Nobis Back Fourth Circuit Practice
In 2012 and 1988, respectively, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
granted petitions for coram nobis in United States v. Akinsade and United
States v. Mandel.101 The grant of coram nobis petitions might suggest that
the Fourth Circuit is willing to use the writ to remedy serious miscarriages of
justice. While the courts in Akinsade and Mandel granted the writ, the
justices in Mandel had starkly different opinions regarding the application of
facts to the specific case.102 Yet, both the majority and the dissent had a
similar view about the importance of coram nobis and its larger impact on
society.103 Judge Widener for the majority stated, "[w]ithout coram nobis
relief, the petitioners, who contested their guilt at each stage of the
96. See id. at 5 (noting how the writ "was and is a limited remedy" and is only available
when no other post-conviction remedy is available to the defendant).
97. Id. at 7.
98. Id. at 28.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 18-27.
101. See United States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 256 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that the
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel was a "fundamental error necessitating coram
nobis relief'); United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting how
defendants had "no other remedy available than ... coram nobis" and how it "is required in
order to achieve justice"). But see Bereano v. United States, 706 F.3d 568, 579 (4th Cir. 2013)
(holding that although the district court's erroneous jury instruction regarding mail fraud was a
constitutional error, the error was harmless and not an error of the most fundamental character
so as to warrant granting the writ).
102. Mandel, 862 F.2d at 1079 (Hall, J. dissenting) (noting that his "sense of justice [did]
not compel [him] to set aside [the] convictions").
103. Id. at 1075, 1077 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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proceeding, would face the remainder of their lives as criminals ...... 104 In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Hall noted how "[c]oram nobis petitions that
attempt to overturn convictions in which the petitioner has fully and
exhaustively litigated his position should be granted only in the most
egregious cases, where circumstances make clear that justice cannot tolerate
letting the conviction stand."'0o Such "egregious cases" would seem to be
situations in which a defendant has been deprived fundamental protections
like due process. o0 Despite the justices' disagreement regarding the
application of the law to the facts of the case at-hand, Justices Widener and
Hall's central understanding of the purpose of coram nobis in our criminal
justice system reinforce its worth as an available post-conviction remedy.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit has made it clear that coram nobis remains a viable
post-conviction remedy for defendants who have experienced serious
miscarriages ofustice.07
Mandel and Akinsade suggest that the Fourth Circuit is willing to, at a
minimum, seriously consider petitions for coram nobis in certain
circumstances.! More than merely indicating openness to considering the
writ, the Circuit prescribed its governing standard for when petitions will be
granted. As the Circuit instructed, four elements must be met in order for a
defendant to obtain coram nobis relief:' 09
(1) A more usual remedy is not available;
(2) Valid reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier;
(3) Adverse consequences exist from the conviction sufficient to satisfy
the case or controversy requirement of Article III; and
(4) The error is of the most fundamental character."0
In Akinsade, the petitioner was a Nigerian immigrant who gained lawful
permanent resident status."' While working as a bank teller, the petitioner
cashed checks for acquaintances and deposited a portion of the proceeds
from those checks into his own account.112 The petitioner eventually
reported the transactions to his supervisor, who contacted the FBI.1 13 The
petitioner was later charged with embezzlement by a bank employee.114 He
104. Id. at 1075.
105. Id. at 1077 (Hall, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1075.
107. Id. at 1074; United States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 2012).
108. Mandel, 862 F.2d at 1077 (Hall, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir.1987)).
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asked his attorney on at least two different occasions about the potential
immigration consequences of pleading guilty."' His attorney advised him
that he could not be deported on the basis of a single offense. Relying on
his attorney's advice that the embezzlement offense would not subject him
to deportation, he pled guilty and served his sentence.! Almost nine years
after his conviction, however, immigration authorities arrested him and
charged him with removability as an aggravated felon based off his previous
embezzlement conviction." Thereafter, the petitioner filed a writ of error
for coram nobis alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights as a
result of his attorney's bad advice.119 The district court denied the petition,
finding that although his attorney's misrepresentation amounted to
constitutionally deficient counsel, the petitioner had not demonstrated that
he had suffered a fundamental error necessitating coram nobis relief.120
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court and held
that the petitioner met all four requirements warranting coram nobis relief.121
The court found that the petitioner easily satisfied the first three
requirements,122 subsequently focusing the majority of its analysis on
whether his attorney's wrongful advice satisfied the fourth element as an
error of the most fundamental character.123 The court prescribed that in order
for the petitioner to show prejudice, he must demonstrate that but-for his
attorney's error, there was a "reasonable probability" that he would not have
pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.124 The court stated that
it could not definitively conclude that "'a reasonable defendant in [the]




118. Id at 251.
119. Id
120. Id (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)) (discussing how the
petitioner was not prejudiced under the second prong of Strickland, which requires a showing
that counsel's errors prejudiced the petitioner's defense.)
121. Id at 252.
122. See id ("First, Akinsade cannot seek relief under the typical remedies for a direct or
collateral attack of a federal judgment and sentence because he is no longer in custody.
Second, valid reasons exist for Akinsade not attacking the conviction earlier. Until physically
detained by immigration authorities in 2009, Akinsade had no reason to challenge the
conviction as his attorney's advice, up to that point in time, appeared accurate. With respect to
the third coram nobis requirement, the risk of deportation is an adverse consequence of
conviction sufficient to create a case or controversy as required by Article III of the
Constitution.").
123. Id
124. Id at 253 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
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advice' about the risks of deportation, 'would have pled guilty anyway had
he known' that his attorney was mistaken.""125 Although the court could not
be certain that the petitioner would have pled differently, the court
nevertheless found that the petitioner had presented sufficient evidence to
establish a reasonable probability that he would have pled differently and
insisted on going to trial absent his attorney's error.126 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit found that the petitioner had suffered a fundamental error warranting
coram nobis relief.127
B. Case Law from Other Jurisdictions and the Reasonable Probability
Standard
At least two jurisdictions have adopted the "reasonable probability"
standard instead of the preponderance of the evidence or another heightened
standard for coram nobis petitions.128 In Arkansas, for example, a petitioner
seeking coram nobis relief need only show a "reasonable probability" that
the judgment would not have been rendered.129 In Mississippi, the state
supreme court has emphasized that the standard for granting coram nobis
relief should be lowered, especially in capital cases, from a probability
standard to a "reasonable probability" standard.130 In Smith v. State, which
involved newly discovered evidence of recanted witness testimony,131 the
Mississippi Supreme Court explained the necessity for a lower standard in
capital cases:
Here we are dealing with the ultimate final judgment-death.
There is no margin for error. Similar to our holdings that normally
125. Id at 256 (quoting U.S. v. Gajendragadkar, No. 97-7267, 1998 WL 352866, at *2
(Apr. 7, 1998)).
126. See id. ("[Petitioner's] counsel asserted that if [petitioner] had gone to trial, he
would have argued that the amount of loss was $8,000. His counsel noted that [petitioner] was
ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $8,000, which he had paid in full, and further that
[petitioner] would have disputed his involvement with a third check that placed him over the
$10,000 amount.").
127. Id
128. Dansby v. State, 37 S.W.3d 599, 601 (2001); Williams v. State, 722 So. 2d 447, 450
(Miss. 1998); Smith v. State, 492 So. 2d 260, 264-65 (Miss. 1986).
129. Dansby, 37 S.W.3d at 601 (applying the reasonable probability standard where there
was an issue of material evidence withheld by the prosecutor).
130. See Williams, 722 So. 2d at 450 (citing Smith, 492 So. 2d at 264) (reiterating the
reasonable probability standard).
131. See Smith, 492 So. 2d at 262 (discussing how the petitioner alleged new material
facts that two witnesses had lied when they made their in-court identifications of the
petitioner).
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harmless error becomes reversible error when the penalty is death,
we hold that in death penalty cases there must only be a reasonable
probability that a different result will be reached.132
South Carolina's neighbor, North Carolina, employs the "reasonable
probability" standard in the analogous context of assessing motions for a
new trial based on evidence that trial testimony has been perjured33 and in
cases in which there was a late-discovered flaw in the jury instructions.134
C. How Coram Nobis Has Been Used, or Rather Not Used, in South
Carolina
The only South Carolina case to discuss the scope and application of the
writ is the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Liles.135 In
State v. Liles, the defendant petitioned for coram nobis alleging that he was
not guilty of manslaughter despite his earlier guilty plea, and that his counsel
was negligent and did not provide him effective legal representation.136
Although the court dismissed the petition for coram nobis,137 the opinion
offers South Carolina's perspective regarding the purpose and function of
the writ. The court provides:
The principal function of the writ of coram nobis is to afford
the Court an opportunity to correct its own record with reference to
a vital fact not known when the judgment was rendered and which
could not have been presented by a motion for a new trial, appeal or
other existing statutory proceeding. It lies for an error of fact not
apparent on the record, not attributable to the appellant's negligence,
and which if known by the Court would have prevented rendition of
the judgment. It does not lie for newly discovered evidence or
132. Id. at 265.
133. See State v. Britt, 360 S.E.2d. 660, 665 (1987) (providing that a defendant may be
granted a new trial based on recanted testimony if "there is a reasonable probability that, had
the false testimony not been admitted, a different result would have been reached at trial").
134. See State v. Rose, 373 S.E.2d 426, 428-29 (1988) (finding that the defendant was
entitled to a new trial based on the reasonable probability that had the jury instruction mistake
not have occurred, a different result would have been reached at trial).
135. State v. Liles, 246 S.C. 59, 70, 142 S.E.2d 433, 440 (1965). A Westlaw search of
cases in South Carolina using the term "coram nobis" yielded twenty-six results; however,
State v. Liles was the only decision that discussed substantive issues and procedures regarding
the writ.
136. Id. at 65, 142 S.E.2d at 434.
137. Id. at 76, 142 S.E.2d at 441.
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newly arising facts or facts adjudicated on the trial. It is not
available where advantage could have been taken of the alleged
error at the trial, as where the facts complained of were known
before or at the trial, or where at the trial the accused or his
attorneys knew of the existence of such facts but failed to present
them.138
State v. Liles seems to align with the First Circuit's perspective,
discussed above, regarding the writ as a legal "Hail Mary" in that coram
nobis should only be used in situations in which all other post-conviction
remedies are not available to the applicant.139 Since State v. Liles, however,
no other South Carolina court has had the opportunity to discuss coram
nobis and its application in the state.140 Despite the fact that South Carolina
courts have not provided further guidance or examples of cases warranting
the writ in fifty years, State v. Liles clearly prescribes the governing legal
standard in South Carolina for warranting a coram nobis petition: the
petitioner must establish that the error of fact "would have prevented" the
judgment.141
V. ADOPTING THE REASONABLE PROBABILITY STANDARD IN SOUTH
CAROLINA
As was made clear by the court in State v. Liles, if a petitioner can prove
that an error of fact "would have" prevented the judgment, coram nobis
relief is warranted.142 Despite Liles' instruction to employ the "would have"
standard, consideration of this heightened standard's unreasonable demands
on petitioners strengthens why South Carolina should adopt a "reasonable
probability" standard. Additionally, strong policy considerations regarding
138. Id at 73-74, 142 S.E.2d at 440 (emphasis added) (citing Dobie v. Commonwealth,
198 Va. 762, 96 S.E.2d 747 (1957)).
139. Id at 73, 142 S.E.2d at 440.
140. For clarification, a search of cases discussing coram nobis decided by the District
Court of South Carolina yielded fifteen cases: Grooms v. United States, No. CR 3:09-1174-
CMC, 2013 WL 5771180, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2013); United States v. Cruel, No. 6:08-CR-
00797-1-JMC, 2013 WL 5522885, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 4, 2013); Little v. United States, No.
C.A.4:02-051, 2003 WL 23851176, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2003). However, the court applied
federal law from the 4 th Circuit Court of Appeals in these cases. Thus, South Carolina has not
been presented with the opportunity to discuss the application and scope of coram nobis under
state law principles since State v. Liles.
141. See Liles, 246 S.C. at 73-74, 142 S.E.2d at 440 (providing how coram nobis lies for
errors "if known by the Court would have prevented rendition of the judgment").
142. Id
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the criminal justice system support a change to a "reasonable probability"
standard. Adopting the "reasonable probability" standard in South Carolina
would give practitioners a better grasp on appropriate situations in which the
writ could be successful for criminal defendants.
First, the "would have" standard demands that a defendant prove, with
certainty, that a different result, i.e., non-conviction, would have occurred
had the error been apparent on the record. Such a standard places too heavy
a burden on defendants appealing their alleged wrongful conviction and does
not comport with the overarching intended purpose of coram nobis to correct
injustices.143 The hurdles a defendant faces, such as exhausting all other
post-conviction remedies, in order to reach coram nobis are already high
enough to eliminate frivolous claims. Thus, the standard for satisfying
coram nobis should not be as cumbersome as the means in which it took a
defendant to be able to employ the writ.
Second, the "would have" standard requires the defendant to prove that
the evidence, a fact not apparent on the record, would have changed the
original court's judgment if known at the time of trial. This high evidentiary
standard raises issues of what evidence exists, if evidence still exists at all,
that would provide a court with such certainty. As in State v. Stinney, in
which the petitioners sought relief seventy years after the initial judgment,144
most coram nobis petitions address decades-old convictions in which
individuals who might have provided exculpatory evidence are no longer
available.145 Requiring defendants to provide evidence from which a court
could determine with absolute certainty that the evidence would have altered
the initial judgment frustrates the nature of the writ itself to correct
fundamental injustices rendered by the original court based on its own
flawed record. Lowering the burden so that it requires a defendant to
establish only with reasonable probability that the evidence, if known at
trial, would have altered the judgment upholds the central purpose of the
writ.
Moreover, strong policy considerations support changing the standard
for coram nobis petitions to "reasonable probability." In criminal cases, it is
essential that the state bears the burden of establishing guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that no reasonable doubt remain in regards to the
143. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408 (1993) (describing coram nobis as a
collateral attack on a wrongful conviction).
144. See infra Part II.
145. See Defendant's Brief at 12 (citing SH, Charles Stinney Dep., 37) (providing that
although two of Stinney's siblings could have provided "highly relevant, exculpatory
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defendant's guilt.146 In cases in which material evidence emerges after the
time for normal appeals, such as direct appeals and habeas corpus, and such
evidence raises questions about whether the state can meet its reasonable
doubt burden, it does not make sense to ask a defendant to demonstrate that
the new evidence warrants exoneration. This would, in effect, shift the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" burden to the defendant, a concept entirely
contradictory to our perceptions of impartiality in the criminal justice
system.147 Moreover, in cases in which the defendant is without fault with
respect to the delay in the availability of evidence, a preponderance of the
evidence or higher standard would leave the defendant worse off, as upon
coram nobis review, the defendant would be responsible for the burdens of
addressing doubts raised by the newly discovered evidence.148 Therefore, the
heightened "would have" standard frustrates the nature of coram nobis by
requiring a defendant to jump through more hoops in addition to the myriad
of ones he already went through to reach coram nobis as his final post-
conviction relief option.
VI. CONCLUSION
George Stinney, Jr.'s case and its subsequent vacated conviction shed
light on South Carolina's haunting past regarding the intersection of racial
stigmas and the systemic failures of the criminal justice system. More
prominent, however, is that Stinney's case reminds South Carolina
practitioners that coram nobis can be a viable post-conviction remedy for
clients in circumstances in which fundamental miscarriages of justice exist.
So long as the defendant has exhausted all remedies under the UPCPA and
other post-conviction avenues, practitioners should consider coram nobis as
a means to redress wrongful convictions or sentences given to defendants.
Because of the basic need to ensure that defendants are not wrongly
incarcerated or executed like Stinney, and that their families do not suffer
the stigma of such wrongful convictions, defense attorneys in South Carolina
should make more use of coram nobis in cases in which newly discovered
evidence would have altered the initial judgment. Further, lowering the
standard to a "reasonable probability"149 like other states would make clear
146. Stephen J. Mulroy, The Safety Net: Applying Coram Nobis Law to Prevent the
Execution of the Innocent, 11 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 1, 23 (2003).
147. Id
148. Id at 23-24.
149. While this Note has mainly focused on adopting a "reasonable probability" standard
with respect to capital cases, the issues discussed apply equally to non-capital cases. Coram
nobis is a useful option for any criminal post-conviction case dealing with the emergence of
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to defense attorneys that the evidentiary standard is not an overly demanding
one. Adopting the "reasonable probability" standard would help South
Carolina practitioners move forward, equipping them with another post-
conviction remedy when faced with the "still-recent history" 5 0 of racialized
injustice on the part of the state's criminal justice system.
exculpatory evidence, and the "reasonable probability" standard should apply in both capital
and non-capital cases.
150. Order at 27.
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